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ABSTRACT
Hospitality firms are susceptible to data breaches due to the high volume of information they keep 
on customers and employees. In this paper, we first present an analysis of the stock market’s reaction 
to data breaches at hospitality firms, and we compare these breaches to a matched- firm sample of 
retail firm breaches. Abnormal stock market returns indicate that hotel and restaurant firm stock 
prices went down by approximately 1.24% from data breach announcements. We find that the type 
of breach or number of times a firm has been breached does not alter the impact of a breach on firm 
returns. Additionally, we find that data breaches cause a greater loss of value for hotel firms than 
for restaurants. Finally, we find no support for the idea that hospitality firms exhibit larger negative 
effects compared to retail firms on a matched-pair analysis.
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1 Introduction and Study Context
Organizations of all types have become increasingly 
susceptible to data breaches, and data breaches, via 
hacking and other exposures, are growing more 
common. Breaches are leading to more costs, occa-
sional fines, and more claims being paid out as the 
cyber liability market matures. The Ponemon Insti-
tute’s 2015 study, Cost of data breach: Global analysis, 
found that German and U.S. companies experienced 
the highest total cost of data breaches, with the U.S. 
at $5.4 million, on average, in 2013.
Data breaches occur in many forms, which 
include hacking, stolen or lost equipment, and poor 
data handling processes. Hotels and restaurants are 
not exempt from this increasing trend, and they may 
be more susceptible to data breaches because of the 
volume of information residing in their systems, 
including credit card data, confidential information 
for loyalty programs, and employee data. Easy access 
to wireless networks, the use of physical point- of- 
sale devices within hotel restaurants and bars, and 
a multitude of employees with access to guest infor-
mation all increase the risk. According to a data 
breach investigation conducted by SpiderLabs’s 
2015 Trustwave Global Security Report, criminals 
go after the food and beverage industry because it 
tends to have high transaction volumes. Criminals 
have found that these organizations have a low bar-
rier to entry from an infiltration standpoint. Spid-
erLabs’s 2015 report found that the hospitality and 
food and beverage industry formed 33% of the 
primary targets of cyber criminals in 2012. Addi-
tionally, a study reported in Hospitality Technology 
(2017) indicated that 74% of hotels do not have data 
breach protection. In this same article John Bell, 
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founder of the security consulting firm Ajontech 
LLC, stated that “hackers love hospitality.” Thus, it 
seems that hospitality firms may have higher data 
breach costs and exposure compared to other retail 
firms. Additionally, it is unclear within the hospi-
tality industry whether hotels or restaurants have 
greater value and risk exposure to data breaches. 
This is because two possibly offsetting effects exist. 
Hotels, because of their low level of preparedness, 
may be worse off than restaurant firms. On the other 
hand, restaurants have a very high rate of transac-
tions and may be more exposed to data breach loss 
than hotel firms. If a difference exists, it is unclear 
which type of firm will suffer a greater decline in 
value from a data breach.
The true cost of a data breach is not limited to the 
financial consequences of lost business and exposure 
to third party liability; there are also risks related to 
reputation ranging from significant to catastrophic. 
This paper analyzes the consequences of data breach 
incidents in hotel and restaurant firms: the effect of 
the announcement of data breaches on stock value. 
Previous studies have looked at the effect of data 
breaches on different groups of firms. This paper is 
the first to examine a sample of events consisting 
exclusively of firms in the hospitality industry. This 
paper aims to identify the economic importance of 
data breaches in the hospitality industry from an 
investor’s viewpoint.
1.1 Outline of the Paper
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section  2 reviews 
the literature and provides the paper’s hypotheses. 
Section 3 explains the research design for the event 
study portion of the paper and describes the sample 
firms used in our event study, event study method-
ology, and the firm and breach characteristics that 
affect the abnormal return of the firms. Results of 
the event study are presented in Section 4. Section 5 
summarizes the findings and contributions of the 
research.
2 Previous Event Studies in Hospitality 
Finance
The usefulness of event study methodology is well- 
established in hospitality literature. Previous event 
studies have examined a variety of factors that may 
impact shareholder value in the hospitality indus-
try including: initial public offerings (Canina, 
1996), acquisitions (Canina, 2001; Ma & Chowdry, 
2011), terrorism (Chang & Zeng, 2011), travel pro-
motion (Johnson, Singh, & Ma, 2015), federal tax 
policy  (Johnson & Johnson, 2016), etc. There are 
no published papers in hospitality literature that 
have used event study methodology to examine the 
impact of data breaches on firm value. However, 
there are numerous examples of event studies out-
side the hospitality literature that have examined the 
effects of data breach on other industries.
The implicit assumption in this methodology 
is that the financial markets respond to news that 
affect a security’s value, so change in stock price is 
a good proxy for the impact of a given event. The 
event study methodology assumes that returns on a 
stock are significantly impacted by an event of inter-
est. Overall, previous studies found that the mar-
ket discriminates breached companies in the first 
few days following the public announcement of the 
breach.
However, no previous studies have investigated 
the impact of security breaches on hospitality firms. 
This study considers the impact of data breaches 
on hospitality firm values. Additionally, the study 
compares the hospitality firm data breaches to a 
matched-pair set of retail firm data breaches.
2.1 Literature Review of Data Breach Event 
Studies and Possible Factors Impacting the Size of 
Abnormal Returns
The results in event study literature that examine 
data breaches and firm value provide mixed and 
possibly contradictory results. Some studies found 
significant negative firm value effects associated 
with data breaches and some did not. Some stud-
ies found that malicious data breaches, hacking, 
cause more harm and other studies did not. Finally, 
one study found that a repeat data breach is more 
detrimental to firm value and some did not. For a 
summary of the results of previous event studies, see 
Table 1 below. The studies in Table 1 all utilized the 
capital asset pricing model to determine the abnor-
mal returns associated with data breach information 
reaching the marketplace. Studies vary in size from 
22 firm breach events over a 7- year period to 467 
breach events over a 10- year period.
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Five of the eight studies examined a broad range 
of breach types across many industries (Acquisti, 
Friedman, & Telang, 2006; Campbell, Lawrence, 
Loeb, & Zhou, 2003; Cavusogul, Mishra, & Raghu-
nathan, 2004; Gatzlaff & McCullough, 2010; John-
son, Kang, & Lawson, 2017). In these broad- sample 
based studies the results range from 0 to −2.1%. 
Johnson et al. (2017), with the largest sample size of 
467, reported a −0.37% return associated with the 
average data breach. The preponderance of the evi-
dence seems to indicate that the average data breach 
is bad news for a firm’s value but is of modest eco-
nomic significance.
Of the three studies that are not broad based, 
the one that may be of greatest interest here is the 
Garg, Curtis, and Harper (2013) study that found, 
for a sample of denial of service hacks, there is a very 
large significant −5.3% abnormal return. Denial 
of service is a type of hacking where the hacker 
degrades the ability of the corporation to serve cus-
tomers and other stakeholders through their IT ser-
vices and websites. This includes but is not limited 
to slowing down the firm’s website, stopping legiti-
mate access through viruses, etc. This result is much 
more severe than that reported in all other studies. 
In general agreement with this result, Campbell 
et  al. (2003) found in their broad sample of firms 
that hacking breaches are significantly more nega-
tive than other data breaches. On the other hand, 
Johnson et  al. (2017); Kannan, Rees, and Sridhar 
(2011); and Gatzlaff and McCullough (2010) found 
that hacking events are not more deleterious to firm 
value. Thus, it is unclear from the previous evidence 
whether breach type impacts the size of the returns 
associated with the data breach.
The final two studies, Kannan et  al. (2011) and 
Hovav and D’Arcy (2003), were based on relatively 
narrow samples of breaches. In the Kannan et  al. 
(2011) study 50% of the breaches were viruses attack-
ing the company’s computer system. These virus 
attacks can be viewed as a type of hacking event. To 
put this in perspective, only 22% of the data breaches 
in the Johnson et al. (2017) study of 467 breaches were 
hacking events. The Hovav and D’Arcy (2003) study 
was limited to the examination of Internet firms. 
Because of the limited scope of these studies it is dif-
ficult to obtain reasonable inferences for the average 
publicly traded firm or the hospitality industry.
Several of the studies went on to examine whether 
a repeat data breach has a different impact on a firm’s 
value than an original event. Here a repeat breach is 
described as a second, third, or subsequent breach 
experienced by a firm within the timespan of the 
study. Hence a breach that is described in a study 
as a first breach could in fact be a repeat breach in 
that an earlier breach occurred prior to the hori-
zon of the study. Gatzlaff and McCullough (2010) 
found that repeat breaches do cause a more nega-
tive response to breaches than first-time events. The 
Gatzlaff study was based on 77 breach events over a 
Table 1. Summary of Previous Data Breach Event Studies
Author Publication
Date
Sample
Size
Category of Firm 
Type
Data Years Window CAAR
Entire
Sample
Hacking
More
Negative?1
Repeat
More
Negative?1
Acquisti
et al.
2006 79 Broad Sample 2000– 2006 2- day −0.58% No N.A.
Campbell
et al.
2003 43 Broad Sample 1995– 2000 3- day Not 
Significant
Yes N.A.
Cavusoglu
et al.
2004 66 Broad Sample 1996– 2001 2- day −2.1% No N.A.
Garg
et al.
2003 22 Denial Of Service 
Attacks (Hacking)
1996– 2002 3- day −5.3% N.A. N.A.
Gatzlaff
et al.
2010 77 Broad Sample 2004– 2006 2- day −0.46% No Yes
Hovav
et al.
2003 23 Internet Only Firms 1998– 2002 3- day Not 
Significant
N.A. N.A.
Johnson
et al.
2017 467 Broad Sample 2005– 2014 3- day −0.37% No No
Kannan
et al.
2004 102 50% Viruses 1998– 2002 4- day Not 
Significant
No No
1. N.A. is defined as not applicable. Many of the previous studies did not examine the possibility that hacking or repeat breaches are more 
destructive to firm value.
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three- year period. On the other hand, Johnson et al. 
(2017), with a broad- based sample of 467 breaches, 
and Kannan et al. (2011), with a narrow sample, both 
found no greater negative effect for repeat breaches. 
Therefore, the evidence, while inconclusive, leans in 
the direction of finding no repeat effect.
The issues investigated in this paper arise from 
the discussion of Section 1, the introduction to the 
paper, and Section 2.1, previous event study results. 
Two sets of issues will be addressed. The first issue 
is determining the average impact of a data breach 
on hospitality firms. The hypothesis for this issue 
is presented in Section 2.2 below. The second set of 
issues asks whether some types of data breaches, or 
types of firms, create a different abnormal return 
than others. In Section  2.3 below there are two 
hypotheses that examine types of data breaches. The 
first breach type is malicious data breaches (MAL), 
which include hacking and insiders misusing data. 
The second type is repeat (REPEAT) data breaches. 
In Section  2.3 there are also two hypotheses that 
examine whether firm type matters. The first of 
these hypotheses examines whether restaurants are 
differentially impacted compared to hotels. The last 
hypothesis addresses whether hospitality firms are 
uniquely worse off in comparison to other retail 
firms.
2.2 Market Reaction to Data Breaches
The first goal of this paper is to discover the extent to 
which data breaches impact the value of firms in the 
hospitality industry. The previous literature seems 
to indicate that the overall impact on firms expe-
riencing data breaches is either negative or zero. 
Five of the eight studies found a significant negative 
effect associated with data breaches and three did 
not. Hence, our first hypothesis, stated in the null, 
becomes:
H1: There is no average abnormal stock market 
reaction to reports of corporate data breaches 
in hotels and restaurants.
2.3 Cross- Sectional Determinants of Market 
Reaction
We also develop four hypotheses about how the 
impact of a data breach on a given firm will vary 
with the firm’s competitive situation and the char-
acteristics of the data breach. The first competitive 
factor is based on the nature of the security breach. 
We identify five types of data breaches across our 
sample of hotel and restaurant data breach events. 
These data breach types are listed in Panel B of 
Table  2 and include insider (INSD), unintended 
disclosure (DISC), physical loss (PHYS), hacking or 
malware (HACK), and portable device (PORT). Two 
of these  types of data breaches, INSD and HACK, 
are based on malicious acts. Insiders that have legiti-
mate access to data but inappropriately release that 
data (INSD) are engaging in a malicious act. Simi-
larly, hacking or malware attacks (HACK) are mali-
cious acts in which an external party, through 
malware or spyware, seeks and exploits weaknesses 
in a computer system or computer network. One 
previous study found that malicious breaches are 
more disruptive than other breaches and five studies 
found no evidence of a differential effect.
Thus, stated in the null, our hypothesis becomes:
H2a: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of  
abnormal negative returns that result from 
MAL breaches will not differ from all other 
types of breach.
The second factor that may influence the magni-
tude of the impact from a data breach is a repeated 
occurrence. One previous study found that repeat 
breaches were more negative than original breaches, 
but two studies found no difference. If negative 
abnormal returns are greater for firms experiencing 
multiple breaches during the time frame examined 
in our sample, it may suggest that investors react 
more strongly to firms that fail to take appropriate 
measures to protect sensitive information after a 
breach incident occurs for the first time.
Thus, stated in the null, our hypothesis becomes:
H2b: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of 
abnormal negative returns due to a privacy 
breach is not different for events that are a 
repeated occurrence of a privacy breach.
The third factor that we consider is the magnitude 
of the impact of a data breach on hotel firms com-
pared to restaurant firms. The Verizon 2012 data 
breach investigation report showed that the most 
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reported data breach incidents in 2012 were from 
accommodation and food services, and around 
95% of these were restaurants while the remaining 
5% were hotels. On the other hand, as discussed in 
the introduction, hotels may be less prepared for 
data breaches than restaurant firms. Thus, the value 
exposure of restaurants and hotels may be signifi-
cantly different in either direction.
H2c: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of abnormal 
negative returns is not significantly different 
in hotels than in restaurants.
Lastly, we compare the magnitude of abnormal 
negative returns in the hospitality industry with 
that of the retail industry off- sample that consists 
of breaches with similar breach types and firm size 
as the sample of hospitality breaches. While we 
do not have a study that specifically suggests this 
hypothesis, we do have a statement from John Bell 
in Hospitality Technology (2017) that “hackers love 
hospitality.” This seems to suggest that hospitality 
firms may be more heavily exposed to data breaches 
than other retail consumer- oriented activities. Thus, 
stated in the null, our hypothesis becomes:
H2d: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of 
abnormal negative returns is not different for 
a set of matched-pair retail firms as compared 
to hospitality firms.
Table 2. Sample Firms and Data Breach Types
PANEL A: Hospitality Firm Names, Breach Dates, Ticker, and Type of Breach
Breach 
Event
Company Name Original Event 
Date
Ticker Type of Breach Mkt Cap in
Billions
1 Flanigans Enterprises, Inc. 05/20/2011 BDL INSD 0.05
2 Cheesecake Factory, Inc. 05/24/2010 CAKE INSD 2.30
3 Cheesecake Factory, Inc. 09/13/2010 CAKE INSD 2.30
4 Cheesecake Factory, Inc. 09/29/2010 CAKE INSD 2.30
5 Choice Hotels International, Inc. 04/26/2012 CHH DISC 3.28
6 Denny’s Corp. 09/30/2013 DENN PHYS 0.85
7 Domino’s Pizza, Inc. 06/18/2008 DPZ PHYS 5.22
8 Starwood Hotels 03/08/2010 HOT HACK 14.56
9 Jack In The Box, Inc. 02/22/2011 JACK INSD 2.92
10 Marriott International, Inc. New 12/28/2005 MAR PORT 22.38
11 Marriott International, Inc. New 02/07/2011 MAR PHYS 22.38
12 McDonald’s Corp. 12/14/2010 MCD HACK 93.73
13 McDonald’s Corp. 08/09/2011 MCD INSD 93.73
14 McDonald’s Corp. 09/12/2011 MCD INSD 93.73
15 McDonald’s Corp. 11/07/2011 MCD INSD 93.73
16 McDonald’s Corp. 11/16/2011 MCD INSD 93.73
17 McDonald’s Corp. 03/09/2012 MCD INSD 93.73
18 McDonald’s Corp. 04/30/2012 MCD INSD 93.73
19 McDonald’s Corp. 02/07/2013 MCD INSD 93.73
20 Papa John’s Intl, Inc. 11/07/2005 PZZA DISC 2.17
21 Starbucks Corp. 11/03/2006 SBUX PORT 62.54
22 Starbucks Corp. 11/24/2008 SBUX PORT 62.54
23 Wyndham Worldwide Corp. 02/16/2009 WYN HACK 10.46
24 Wyndham Worldwide Corp. 03/01/2010 WYN HACK 10.46
PANEL B: Description of Type of Breaches Observed in Hospitality Firms
Data Breach 
Type
DISC Unintended disclosure: Sensitive information posted publicly on a website, mishandled, or sent to the wrong party via 
email, fax, or mail.
HACK Hacking or malware: Electronic entry by an outside party, malware and spyware that is malicious in nature.
INSD Insider: Someone with legitimate access intentionally breaches information, such as an employee or contractor with 
malicious intent.
PHYS Physical loss: Lost, discarded, or stolen non- electronic records, such as paper documents.
PORT Portable device: Lost, discarded, or stolen laptop, PDA, smartphone, portable memory device, CD, hard drive, data tape, 
etc.
REPEAT A proxy for breaches that represent a repeated occurrence for the individual firm within the time frame of the  
study.
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3 Event Study Research Design
This section discusses the data and research design 
used in the study.
3.1 Sample Firms
The sample used for this study consists of instances of 
data breaches that publicly traded entities in the hos-
pitality industry have been susceptible to in the past 
10 years. The list of breaches appears in Table 2. This 
sample was derived by collecting a list of all data 
breaches from the last 10 years from Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse. We chose this medium for selecting 
our sample because we wanted to develop a sam-
ple that was representative of the sum of informa-
tion security breaches. Our search for information 
security breaches covers the period of January 2005 
through December 2014. The raw dataset obtained 
from Privacy Rights Clearinghouse contained 1,715 
data breach events in sectors including business, edu-
cational institutions, government/military, health 
care/medical providers, and nonprofit organizations. 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse obtains its lists through 
federal and state government reports, reports in major 
newspapers, and online reports of data breaches. This 
list was sorted for publicly traded companies in the 
United States that operate in the restaurant and hotel 
business. This narrowed our initial selection down to 
31 data breach events and 15 unique publicly listed 
U.S. firms.
Additional sample selection criteria are the avail-
ability of sufficient returns history (i.e., a minimum 
public trading history) from the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) database for the estima-
tion period necessary for our event study, continu-
ity in the corporate entity’s identity over the period, 
and elimination of multiple events where estimation 
periods overlap earlier events for the same firm.1 
Seven events were eliminated, leaving us with 24 
observations and 13 unique publicly listed U.S. firms 
in the hotel and restaurant business.
1 When there is an overlap in the estimation period with a prior event for the same firm, we use the earlier event reporting 
date.
2 Burger King Holdings, Inc. (BKC) was delisted in October 2010 and then listed again in June 2012 as Burger King Worldwide, Inc.
3 At the time of writing, there was no availability of sufficient returns history (i.e., a minimum public trading history) for the year 
2014 in the CRSP database.
Two of the events that were eliminated from the 
initial sample selection were due to the unavail-
ability of sufficient returns history on the CRSP 
database. These data breach events are the Burger 
King Worldwide, Inc. (BKW) insider breach on 
February 27, 20122 and the Las Vegas Sands Corp. 
(LVS) hacking on February 12, 2014.3 Another two 
events were eliminated due to confounding occur-
rences around the data breach event date. The first 
firm, Domino’s Pizza, Inc. (DPZ), had a data breach 
on May  12, 2011, and made several significant 
announcements around this period. On April  27, 
2011, Domino’s Pizza, Inc. announced the acqui-
sition of a majority stake in the exclusive master 
franchise to own, operate, and franchise Domino’s 
Pizza stores in Germany. On May 5, 2011, the group 
announced its first quarter results and on May 18, 
2011, it was awarded the “chain of the year” award 
for the third time back-to-back. The second firm, 
Wyndham Worldwide Corp. (WYN), had a data 
breach on June  12, 2013, that was eliminated due 
to a Florida law that protected timeshare owners 
signed on June 13, 2013. Wyndham Vacation Own-
ership, a member of Wyndham Worldwide’s family 
companies, as reported in a 2013 press release, is the 
world’s largest vacation ownership business as mea-
sured by the number of vacation ownership resorts, 
individual vacation ownership units, and owners of 
vacation ownership interests.
Wendy’s Company and McDonald’s Corp. also 
had breach events that were eliminated from the 
sample. The Wendy’s Company (WEN) had two 
events that had to be eliminated because the events 
occurred in 2007 and 2008 under the name Triarc 
Companies, Inc. and operated as a holding com-
pany for varied businesses. The last event eliminated 
was the McDonald’s Corp. (MCD) data breach on 
November 18, 2011, because it overlapped with the 
event window of the data breach on November 16, 
2011. Table 2 provides a list of the 24 events and the 
relevant firms, their ticker symbols, the date the data 
breaches were reported, and the type of breach.
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3.2 Off- Sample Firms
To compare the sample of hospitality firms to non- 
hospitality firms, an off- sample of retail firms were 
selected. A list of these off- sample, matched  firms is 
provided in Table 3.
The off- sample consists of instances of data 
breaches that publicly traded entities in the retail 
industry have been susceptible to in the past 
10  years. This sample was derived by collecting a 
list of all data breaches from the last 10 years from 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. The raw dataset 
obtained from Privacy Rights Clearinghouse con-
tained 1,715 data breach events in sectors includ-
ing business, educational institutions, government/
military, health care/medical providers, and non-
profit organizations. This list was then sorted for 
publicly traded companies in the United States that 
operate in the retail industry as defined by Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse. Twenty- four matched events 
were selected such that the events were the same 
breach type and the nearest market capitalization 
(based on 2015 values) available as those in Table 2.
Additional sample selection criteria are the avail-
ability of sufficient returns history (i.e., a minimum 
1 When there is an overlap in the estimation period with a prior event for the same firm, we use the earlier event reporting date.
public trading history) from the CRSP database for the 
estimation period necessary for our event study, conti-
nuity in the corporate entity’s identity over the period, 
and elimination of multiple events where estimation 
periods overlap earlier events for the same firm.1
3.3 Test of Market Reaction
The first hypothesis is tested by examining the 
overall industry market reaction to the reporting 
date of each data breach event. The market reac-
tion was determined by measuring daily abnormal 
returns (ARs), i.e., the difference between actual 
and expected returns. To control for the effects of 
market- wide fluctuations, the market model is used 
to measure expected returns:
 Rit = αi + βiRmt + eit (1)
where:
Rit is the return for the ith data breach event 
on day t,
αi is the intercept for the ith data breach 
event,
Table 3. One- to- One Matched Pair of Retail Firm
Off- Sample PERMNO Company Name Original  
Event Date
Ticker Type Mkt Cap  
in Billions
1 84255 Seachange International, Inc. 09/08/2010 SEAC INSD 0.27
2 91391 Windstream Corp. 01/27/2012 WIN INSD 4.80
3 75489 Staples, Inc. 02/02/2012 SPLS INSD 9.20
4 86580 Nvidia Corp. 01/13/2013 NVDA INSD 12.32
5 89757 Sears Holdings Corp. 01/07/2008 SHLD DISC 3.54
6 90396 Cubesmart 02/03/2012 CUBE PHYS 4.08
7 46922 Rite Aid Corp. 07/27/2010 RAD PHYS 5.52
8 85914 Best Buy Company, Inc. 05/06/2011 BBY HACK 12.47
9 59010 GAP, Inc. 04/16/2010 GPS INSD 17.27
10 39087 Sprint Nextel Corp. 01/22/2007 S PORT 19.67
11 39917 Weyerhaeuser Co. 08/10/2006 WY PHYS 18.01
12 25785 Ford Motor Co. Del 05/05/2012 F HACK 65.51
13 12369 General Motors Corp. 08/03/2012 GM INSD 60.95
14 19502 Walgreen Co. 03/11/2011 WAG INSD 65.20
15 19502 Walgreen Co. 02/15/2013 WAG INSD 65.20
16 19502 Walgreen Co. 12/20/2013 WAG INSD 65.20
17 19502 Walgreen Co. 06/07/2014 WAG INSD 65.20
18 77418 Time Warner, Inc. New 07/28/2010 TWX INSD 71.71
19 17005 CVS Corp. 03/09/2011 CVS INSD 104.82
20 10517 Aarons, Inc. 10/22/2013 AAN DISC 2.11
21 89954 DirecTV Group, Inc. 10/11/2006 DTV PORT 43.21
22 27828 Hewlett Packard Co. 12/11/2008 HPQ PORT 60.54
23 89217 Advance Auto Parts, Inc. 03/31/2008 AAP HACK 10.99
24 42585 Smucker J. M. Co. 03/04/2014 SJM HACK 11.64
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βi is the slope coefficient for the ith data 
breach event,
Rmt is the return on an equal- weighted market 
portfolio on day t,
eit is the error term with mean zero.
Following the conventions of previous studies 
(e.g. Hughes, Magat, & Ricks, 1986; Jarrell & Pelt-
zman, 1985; and the findings of Brown & Warner 
[1980, pp. 242– 243]; Brown & Warner [1985, p. 12]; 
and Binder & Summer [1985, p.  173]), an equal- 
weighted market index is used as a proxy for the 
market rate of return. The parameters αi and βi were 
estimated for the event by using 255 trading days 
of daily return data. Generally, in event studies, we 
want the parameters of the model to be estimated 
over a short time period before the event occurs. 
This involves a trade- off. The closer the estimation 
period is to the event period, the less likely it is that 
sample firm betas have changed due to changes in 
leverage, management strategy, and firm invest-
ments, etc. But estimation data from a period too 
close to the event period may be contaminated 
information leakage. We choose to estimate the 
parameters of the model using 255  days of data 
prior to each data breach event reporting date. We 
did this to, as much as possible, avoid confounding 
information about the data breach event that could 
potentially bias the estimates. Once the parameters 
αi and βi have been estimated for each firm, the daily 
prediction errors (abnormal returns) for firm i were 
calculated as follows:
 ARit = Rit – (αi + ΒiRmt) (2)
where ARit is the abnormal return for firm i on day t.
We examine abnormal returns for the three- 
day window that includes the event day and the 
two trading days immediately before and after the 
event. Inclusion of the trading day prior to the 
event controls for information leakage that may 
occur if some market participants are privy to the 
information prior to public announcement. Inclu-
sion of the trading day after the event accounts for 
late arrival of information to the market or adjust-
ment to information that requires time for market 
participants to interpret the true value effect of the 
data breach. A window that is too large will include 
extraneous information. Conversely, a window that 
is too small will not fully capture the effects of 
information leakage or slow market adjustment. 
We choose a window of three days. Thus, our results 
are reasonably conservative and should cover a sig-
nificant amount of the impact of the data breach. 
Table 1 reveals that the choice of a three- day event 
window is similar to the event window length 
used in previous data breach event studies. Spe-
cifically, four of the previous reported studies use 
a three- day window with the remaining studies 
using either a two- or four- day window. The three- 
day cumulative abnormal returns for each firm was 
computed as below:
 +1
 CARi = Σ ARit (3)
 t = – 1
where
CARi is the cumulative abnormal return for data 
breach event i,
ARit is the abnormal return for data breach 
event i on day t,
t = 0 is the day the data breach is reported to the 
government.
To determine the average overall impact of the 
events on the industry, we calculate the three- day 
cumulative average abnormal return by summing 
across the n firms in the sample and dividing by the 
number of firms in the sample as below:
 24
 CAAR = Σ CARi/24 (4)
 i = 1
where
CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal 
return across all 24 events in the sample,
CARi is the three- day cumulative return for 
data breach event i around the event.
CAAR is the three- day cumulative average abnormal 
returns for the sample. To examine whether each 
informational event had a significant average return 
effect on the industry, a test of the null hypothesis 
that the three- day cumulative average abnormal 
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return across firms equals zero, for H1, is performed 
using Patel’s Z-statistic.
3.4 Cross- Sectional Analysis and Matched- Pair 
Analysis of Competitive Factors
Cross- sectional analysis is employed to test the three 
hypotheses that differences in abnormal returns 
across firms are explained by underlying differences 
in the firms’ competitive positions in terms of type of 
breach or whether the firm is a hotel or a restaurant. 
Specifically, multiple regression analysis is used to 
examine the relationship between each firm’s market 
reaction to their respective data breach events and 
three characteristics that are predicted to explain 
some of the variation across data breach events.
The first explanatory variable is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the breach type is a malicious act 
(hack or insider misuse of data) and zero if it is not.
The second independent explanatory variable is 
a dummy that equals one if the breach is a repeat 
event for the firm involved and zero if it is not.
The third independent explanatory variable is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm involved 
in the breach is a restaurant and zero if it is a hotel.
We estimate the following multiple regression 
model for all available observations in the sample:
 Model: (5) 
 CARi = γ0 + γ1MALi + γ2REPEATi + γ3RESTi
where
CARi is the three- day cumulative return for 
firm i,
MALi is a dummy variable that equals one  
if the type of breach is malicious  
(hack or insider misuse of 
information),
REPEATi is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the breach is a repeat event for the 
firm involved,
RESTi is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the firm involved in the breach is a 
restaurant,
γ0, γ1, γ2, γ3 are the estimated intercept and three 
slope coefficients, respectively.
Our second and third coefficients represent a test of 
H2a that the estimated coefficient on HACK, γ1, will 
be zero, and H2b that the estimated coefficient on 
REPEAT, γ2, will be zero. Our fourth coefficient  is 
a test of the H2c hypothesis that predicts the esti-
mated coefficient on REST, γ3, will be zero. The 
results of the cross- sectional analysis are discussed 
in Section 4.2.
To test the last hypothesis, H2d, a matched-pair 
sample of comparable retail firms was selected 
based on our sample of hospitality firms. Based on 
extensive simulation results, Davies and Kim (2007) 
concluded that the best practice for construct-
ing matched samples is to match firms one- to- one 
based on market capitalization and share price. 
Their results showed that tests based on one- to- one 
nearest- neighbor matching have comparable power 
and less size distortion than alternatives that place 
more weight on distant firms. We have used the 
following criteria to select a sample of one- to- one 
nearest- neighbor matching of retail firms: a)  off- 
sample breach is for a retail firm as defined by Pri-
vacy Rights Clearinghouse, b) off- sample breach is 
a one- to- one match for the type of breach, c) off- 
sample breach after being matched by “a” and “b” is 
chosen as the firm breach such that the firm has the 
nearest possible firm size in terms of market capi-
talization at end of year 2015.
We then test the matched-pair sample by exam-
ining the overall industry market reaction to the 
reporting date of each data breach event. The market 
reaction was determined by measuring daily abnor-
mal returns (ARs) in the same manner as discussed 
in Section 3.3. To control for the effects of market- 
wide fluctuations, the market model is used to mea-
sure expected returns:
 Rit = αi + βiRmt + eit (1)
Table  3 provides a list of the 24 matched-pair 
events and the relevant firms, their ticker symbols, 
the date the data breaches were reported, and the 
type of breach.
Finally, we compare via t-test (unequal variances), 
f-test, and Wilcoxon signed rank test the CARs on 
a matched-pair basis between the hospitality and 
retail firms to determine whether the two samples of 
breaches are similar.
84 M. S. JOHNSON ET AL.
4 Results
4.1 Results of Event Testing
Table  4 presents our test of hypothesis H1, which 
predicts that there is no effect on stock returns from 
data breaches.
CAAR, the cumulative average abnormal return, 
is an average of individual firm CARs.
 24
 CAAR = Σ CARi (6)
 i = 1
where
CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return 
for the sample of 24 data breach events,
CARi is the cumulative abnormal return 
for data breach event i over the event 
window.
The CAAR for the hotel and restaurant data breaches 
in our sample is −1.24% at a level of significance of 
0.062 for the Patel Z-Statistic. There are several dif-
ferent test statistics that are used in event studies. In 
other words, the equity values of our sample firms’ 
equity reduced by an average of 1.24% in response 
to the data breaches. We find modest support for 
the conclusion that data breaches have a significant 
negative impact on the publicly traded hotel and 
 restaurant firms in our sample.
4.2 Results of Cross- Sectional and Matched- Pair 
Analysis
Table 5 provides a summary of the results of a cross- 
sectional regression and hypothesis testing for H2a, 
H2b and H2c.
The findings do not reject the null hypotheses 
regarding MAL and REPEAT (at the 10% level). 
That is, malicious breaches and repeat breaches 
are no more, nor less, hurtful to hospitality firms. 
However, the coefficient on REST is positive and 
has a p-value of 0.056. It is reasonable to conclude 
that this provides modest evidence that restaurants 
are less negatively impacted by data breaches than 
hotels. This may be due to a lower level of prepared-
ness on the part of hotels. This result seems to sup-
port the results of the study reported in Hospitality 
Technology (2017).
Table  6 presents our test of hypothesis H2d, 
which predicts that the stock price reaction to data 
breaches is different for hospitality firms as com-
pared with off- sample matched retail firms.
The average abnormal return for the off- sample 
retail firms is − 0.39% compared to − 1.24% in the 
hospitality firms. However, the result is insignificant 
at the 10% level for all three tests examined. That is, to 
test the hypothesis three test statistics are provided a 
simple t-test (assuming unequal variances), an f-test, 
and a Wilcoxon signed rank test (non- parametric). 
The table reveals that all three tests are unable to 
reject the null hypothesis of equal means with a 10% 
level of significance. Therefore, despite the difference 
in means, − 1.24% versus − 0.39%, we are unable to 
claim that the two samples are significantly different. 
That is, hospitality firms are not impacted more, or 
less, heavily by data breaches than retail firms.
5 Summary, Conclusions, and 
Recommendations for Future Research
We examined the market reaction of hotel and 
restaurant firms to data breach events. The first 
result provided by the study is that there is mod-
est evidence of a significant negative stock price 
effect  from the average data breach. These nega-
tive effects may be attributed to current payments to 
customers associated with the breach and possible 
future declines in revenue from lost consumer con-
fidence. The 1.24% negative cumulative abnormal 
Table 4. Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) 
over a Three- Day Event Window around the Sample of 24 
Data Breaches in Publicly Traded Hospitality Firms
Event Tested Three- Day
CAAR1
Pos/Neg2 Patel Z- Statistic 
(p- Value)3
Data Breaches − 1.24% 10/14 − 1.539 (0.0620)
1. CAAR is the average abnormal return for the 24 event breaches 
in our sample over the three- day event window, day before, day 
of, and day after each data breach event. Abnormal returns are 
calculated using an equal weighted market index.
2. More of the firms had negative returns over the three- day event 
window.
3. The Patel Z- Statistic is generally recognized as the most 
appropriate test statistic for an event study of this type (Bloom, 
2011). It is worth noting that a strict cutoff of 5% level of 
significance would have us not reject the null hypothesis. However, 
the authors think that 6% reflects general support for rejection of 
the null given the small sample size in the study.
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return represents approximately a $2.7 billion loss in 
the value of these publicly traded hotel and restau-
rant firms. Second, we find that individual breach 
characteristics do not help predict the individual 
firm effect. That is, malicious events and repeat 
events are no better, nor worse, than other events. 
Third, the average hospitality firm faces no more 
value risk from a breach than a comparably sized 
retail firm. However, restaurants appear to be less 
impacted by data breaches than hotel firms. Thus, 
managers of hotel firms should raise their level of 
concern about potential data breaches because their 
firms appear to face greater value at risk from data 
breaches than restaurant firms. Managers of hospi-
tality firms should be aware that predicting actu-
alized breach costs based on firm specific data is 
difficult. This is seen in the lack of significance in 
some of the cross- sectional analysis. Finally, man-
agers should not become complacent after a breach 
has occurred because subsequent breaches appear to 
be just as costly as first- time breaches.
This paper is a first attempt to examine the impact 
of data breaches on hospitality firms. The sample size, 
at 24 data breaches, is relatively small compared to 
many other event studies. Hence it is not surprising 
that our summary and conclusions are somewhat 
tentative based upon a p-value of 6% for the overall 
CAAR. This leads us to three recommendations for 
future research. One, when more data breach obser-
vations for the hospitality industry become available 
the event study analysis should be re- run to verify the 
preliminary results provided in this paper. Two, a sur-
vey of IT managers would provide a means of under-
standing the different costs of data breaches. Finally, 
since the results provided in this paper represent the 
market’s expectation of value effects, a study that 
examined post- breach firm performance may provide 
insights into the actualized costs of data breaches.
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